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This paper identi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1 Introduction
A¢ rmative action, or more generally, preferences are ubiquitous in much of the world. The idea is often
put as levelling the playing eld, or even tilting it in favor of certain groups so as to atone for past
injustices. In this paper we develop a rationale for a¢ rmative action that is di¤erent from that o¤ered so
far in the literature. We develop a simple model of contests with large numbers of agents (so that strategic
e¤ects are removed) and objects. There are two groups: the disadvantaged and the rest of society and two
kinds of ability, native and acquired. The test, which determines placement, values acquired ability more
highly than does society. E¤ort is expended in order to do well in the test and is potentially wasteful.
Our rationale for a¢ rmative action, or giving preferences to the disadvantaged, is based on modelling
the trade-o¤ between wasteful e¤ort and selection. On the one hand, conditional on getting in, the
disadvantaged tend to put in more e¤ort just to get in, as they need to do so being disadvantaged.
Such e¤ort is wasteful, which works against giving preferences to the disadvantaged. On the other hand,
conditional on winning, the disadvantaged have higher native ability than the advantaged. This factor
works in favor of having preferences. While there is no one size ts all answer, the results obtained
suggest when a¢ rmative action is likely to be benecial. The model would apply to the system in place
in India as its rules are very clear cut. It would also apply to the US setting in spirit, though the US
admission system is very nuanced. Our results suggest that in countries, like India, where education is
free and preferences are extreme, such reverse discrimination is very harmful to society. However, in the
US, where education is costly and preferences are marginal, such a policy may well be benecial.
The examples and simulations provide a number of other interesting results. They suggest that even
when there are no di¤erences between agents, without imposing any unreasonable conditions, it may be
welfare increasing to create them by allowing some agents access to education while denying it to others.
This could be done by having a lottery that allocates access, or by allowing access to one group and not
another. Such articial di¤erences may be optimal both when there is no di¤erence between what society
values and what the test does, and when there is.
We will proceed as follows. In the rest of the introduction, we rst provide some background on the
prevalence and rationale for preferences in the US and the world. Following this we relate our work to the
existing literature. Section 2 lays out the key elements of our model and the raison dêtre behind them,
making it clear how our work di¤ers from the literature. It also works through the properties of basic
model. Section 3 denes the e¤ort e¤ectand selection e¤ectand shows formally that while the former
works against giving preferences, the latter works in favor of preferences. Section 4 uses an example and
develops some simulations to better understand the case for unequal treatment or preferences. Section 5
discusses extensions and Section 6 concludes.
2
1.1 Background
As President Lyndon B. Johnson said in a speech at Howard University1 in 1965:
Freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by
chains .. bring him to the starting point of a race and then say youre free to competeand
justly believe that you have been completely fair.
In 1965 President Johnson issued executive order No. 11246 that required all federal contractors to
take a¢ rmative action to promote the hiring of blacks and other minorities. A¢ rmative action was,
ironically, seen as way to ensure that employees are treated ...without regard to their race, creed, color
or national origin. In Philadelphia for example, specic quotas were set for each of the building and
construction trades for blacks, but by the mid seventies, opposition to quotas was growing. In Bakke vs.
the University of California, Davis, the Supreme court ruled that Allan Backke, a white medical school
applicant, was denied admission on the basis of his race as a quota was set aside for deprived minorities.
However, it upheld the use of race as a legitimate criteria in admissions.
Blacks and Hispanics are still given preferences in higher education. Nevertheless, the scope for giving
race based preferences has been considerably reduced over the years. While schools used to actively target
a given level of minority presence, i.e., meet quotas, such quotas are not acceptable today. In 2003,
the U.S. Supreme Court approved the use of points to promote a diverse student body. However, a
number of states, such as Texas, have moved away from using only race based preferences and added
other measures. Texas now gives the top 10% of students from public high schools in Texas automatic
admission to the states agship public university, UT Austin, in addition to using points to help diversify
the student body as allowed by the 2003 supreme court ruling. The Supreme Court very recently ruled
on Fisher versus the University of Texas which challenged the current policy.2 The ruling seems to have
further reduced the space in which universities could give preferences.
In India, preferences are given in higher education and in public sector jobs to scheduled castes and
tribes and these preferences are quite extreme. Preferences reserve a fraction of seats, proportional
to their population share, for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The former were traditionally
relegated to unpleasant tasks as untouchables, while the latter were outside the traditional caste system
in India.3 Indias allocation system is based on performance in open competitive exams. The di¤erence in
cuto¤ scores for admission between those given preferences and the general category is huge. Moreover,
Indias higher educational system is heavily subsidized. Brazil also approved an a¢ rmative action bill in
2012 that reserves half the spots in federal universities for high school graduates of public schools, and
distributes the reserved spots among black, mixed race and indigenous students according to the racial
1A leading historically black institution.
2Abigail Noel Fisher was denied admission to UT Austin and is white.
3See Frisancho and Krishna (2012) for more on this.
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makeup of each state.
1.2 Related Literature
Much of the work in economics on the a¤ects of preferences has focused on what is called models of
statistical discrimination. If ability is unobserved, but correlated with an observable like race, this line of
work argues that race based preferences may be counterproductive or even create inequality where none
existed. Another line of work has focused on a¢ rmative action as a way of mitigating di¤erential access
to education due to credit constraints. A third line has looked at the issue in the context of contests.
We discuss each of these below. While we focus on the theoretical work, we also discuss the relevant
empirical work as needed.
1.2.1 Statistical Discrimination
Models of statistical discrimination are the dominant line of research in this area. The key papers are
those of Arrow (1973), Phelps (1972) and Coate and Loury (1993). The reason is that preferences create
a culture of dependence. Intuitively, less e¤ort is put in by the group given preferences, precisely
because preferences make it easy to get jobs even without e¤ort. As a result, people expect the group
given preferences to be worse, and these expectations are validated in equilibrium. Even if there are no
di¤erences between groups, quotas giving preferences to one group over the other can end up hurting
them through this channel. See Fang and Moro (2011) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
On the empirical side, Ferman and Assuncao (2005) suggest that the e¤ort expended by those o¤ered
preferences falls. They exploit a natural experiment which arose when a racial admissions quota was
imposed on two of Rio De Janeiros top public universities. Using a di¤erence -in-di¤erence approach,
they found a 5.5% decrease in standardized test scores among the favored group. This constituted a 25%
widening of the achievement gap. Moro (2003) estimates a structural model of statistical discrimination
for the US and his work suggests that though wage inequality has declined in the US this is not because
of a switch in the equilibrium. A counterfactual exercise suggests that in a color-blind society blacks
wage would have been on average more than 20% higher. Moro and Norman (2004) incorporate general
equilibrium e¤ects in the labor market into a model with statistical discrimination. They nd that while
a¢ rmative action may increase the minority workers incentive to invest in learning while diminishing
the non minoritys.
In any case, it is far from clear that a¢ rmative action on the basis of race is optimal. There is concern
that admitting students based on preferences creates mismatch. In extreme cases, this mismatch may
result in their being worse o¤ than if they went to a school or program better suited to their preparation
level. See Rothstein and Yoon (2008) for work on Law Schools in the US and Frisancho-Robles and
Krishna (2012) for work on quotas in India. On the other hand, Alon and Tienda (2007) suggest that
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students admitted under the 10% rule in Texas had a higher graduation rate. Arcidiacano et. al (2012)
shows that this may be due to their choosing easier courses/majors. In addition, giving preferences on
the basis of income rather than race seems to be called for. Cestau, Epple and Sieg (2012) empirically
investigate the importance of using race as basis for a¢ rmative action. They develop and estimate a
structural model of admission to a gifted and talented program for children entering the rst grade
kindergarten program in a mid sized urban school district in the US. Their work suggests that once
admission to the program is allowed to depend on being part of the free lunch program or not4 , further
conditioning on race gives little benet to society.
1.2.2 Credit Constraints
The second line of work, distinct from statistical discrimination, looks at preferences in the presence of
credit constraints. The basic idea is that markets work well in allocating agents to seats. Monetary bids
are just transfers and as long as those with the most to gain from obtaining the seats are also those that
society wants to have the seats, i.e., there is no misalignment in social and private benet, markets will
give the rst best allocation at the lowest cost. Contests on the other hand involve wasted resources even
if they result in the same allocations. Thus, they are dominated by the market. However, if there are
credit constraints, then contests may give a better allocation and so be worth the wasted resources they
engender, see Fernandez and Gali (1999). Of course, to the extent that credit constraints are income
rather than race based, such arguments also favor income based preferences. Also, basic economics (in the
form of the principle of targeting which calls for policies to operate on the same margin as the distortion)
would suggest that preferences are not the rst best solution if the distortion lies in access to credit.5
1.2.3 Contests
There is considerable recent work on the role of preferences in education couched in the contests setup,
both with small numbers of agents so that there is a strategic e¤ect, and with large numbers where there
is not. Here the main issue is whether contests encourage e¤ort or not and e¤ort is seen as being good
per se.
Fu (2007) and Fain (2009) have a model with two agents, a minority one who is handicapped relative
to the non minority agent. They compete to get in to a school. E¤ort raises performance at some cost,
though performance has a random component. A¢ rmative action (giving more weight to the score of
minorities) can increase the e¤ort expended by all agents, and if this is the objective, then a¢ rmative
action may be desirable.
More recently, Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2011) model a duopoly setting where colleges set admission
standards and the ability of students is only partially observable. Students choose the portfolio of schools
4This is o¤ered to poor students in the US.
5For a nice recent survey on the role of credit constraints in education, see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012).
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to apply to and schools choose admission rules. They show a number of interesting asymmetries arise in
the comparative statics and argue that their model helps explain the observed fall in minority applicants
to top public universities after a¢ rmative action was removed. Such schools were removed from the
portfolio of minority students who now had less of a chance of getting in.
These strategic models are less closely related to our work than those based on a competitive setting
like that in Fryer and Loury (2013). This paper looks at the least cost way of achieving a given diversity
goal. In their model there are a given number of slots that agents want to acquire. In the rst period,
agents make investment decisions and these decisions result in a distribution of second period abilities.
The minority group is seen as having higher costs of such investments and as a result are on average
disadvantaged ex-post in terms of getting these slots. As there are no externalities or distortions, the
market allocation of slots is e¢ cient. They ask, when should the intervention occur: Ex ante or ex post?
Should intervention should be sighted (based on race say) or blind (based on say being in the top 10%).
They show that if the policy can be sighted, then ex post intervention (a subsidy for the disadvantaged
group) is all that is needed to meet the target as this subsidy also raises the ex ante incentive to invest
by the minority group. In contrast to their work, we explicitly model a possible reason for a¢ rmative
action: namely that native ability is more valuable to society than acquired ability and look for when a
case for unequal treatment can be made.
Chan and Eyster (2003) look at whether sighted or blind intervention is more e¢ cient. They argue
that a ban on a¢ rmative action is ine¢ cient in practice. Universities with a wish for diversity will just
obtain it using an alternative criterion which is less e¢ cient at identifying student quality. Fryer, Loury
and Yuret (2008) estimate these costs to be four to ve times as high as color-conscious a¢ rmative
action.6
Hickman (2011) compares quotas, admission preferences, and a color blind system and shows that they
di¤er in terms of their e¤ects. He uses an all pay auction setting and then takes the limit of the auction
as the number of agents rises. In an auction setting, the distribution of costs (or valuations) of those
you are competing with plays an essential role in how you bid. With a quota system, minorities compete
for slots only with other minorities who have a worse distribution of costs than non minorities. With a
points system, where minorities are given some points and then compete with the general population,
competitors have better costs. With a color blind system, that does not give preferences there are no
points given to minorities. As a result, with quotas, the best minorities put in less e¤ort than under a
system of preferences, while the worst minorities put in more e¤ort. For non minorities, the e¤ects are
6There is also the question of whether lower admission standards result in minority students being out of their depth
and so performing poorly. There is a literature on mismatch and catchup that relates to this question which we will not
say much about here. See Frisancho-Robles and Krishna (2012) for a literature review and some evidence on this topic
using Indian data. Loury and Garman (1993) show that for a given performance, blacks gain more in subsequent earnings
from attending selective colleges than whites. However, for many blacks and some whites at such institutions the gain from
attending a selective college may be o¤set by worse performance.
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reversed. Hickman focuses on both the e¤ort elicited and on the gap in attainment and cuto¤s. The
former is seen as a positive and the latter as a negative. It is worth noting that similar results, though
for di¤erent reasons, occur in the presence of uncertainty in performance. In this case, the e¤ort prole
is hump shaped in ability. Agents that are very good need to put in little e¤ort and those that are very
bad know that they have little chance of getting in and so choose to put in little e¤ort. Agents who are in
between are highly motivated as their chances of getting in rise steeply with e¤ort. Giving preferences to
the disadvantaged reduces their cuto¤ score. This reduces the e¤ort of the more able in the disadvantaged
group but raises that of the less able and as the latter are predominant, tends to raise overall e¤ort.
We focus on anonymous contests7 and the e¤ect of preferences in such settings. While contests
play many roles8 , we abstract from most of these below and zoom in on their e¤ort costs. Contests
encourage e¤ort, and to the extent that such e¤ort is under/over supplied, this directly raises/reduces
welfare. Examples of wasteful e¤ort are manyfold: managers may undercut their competitors at the cost
of the company bottom line and salesmen may steal their rivals customers. E¤ort itself tends to be
privately benecial but socially wasteful when there are rents being competed for, or agents incentives
are misaligned with those of the principal or society. We focus only on the costs of e¤ort and its social
versus private benets in this paper, abstracting from other dimensions such as those above.
Although we use placement in educational institutions as the example, other applications are possible.
Our setting is non strategic with large numbers of applicants who understand they cannot a¤ect the
equilibrium cuto¤s by their actions. This environment makes it much easier to analyze the case for
preferences. A number of the insights in Siegel (2009) hold in our framework, albeit in a more transparent
manner. There is also recent related work on contests with head starts, see Siegel (2013). Our setup
di¤ers from the work on contests with head starts both in terms of being non strategic, and in allowing
intrinsic di¤erences between agents in their abilities. With head starts, all agents typically di¤er only in
terms of how far ahead they are, while we allow for interactions between native and acquired ability and
e¤ort. We also explicitly focus on social welfare and how policies a¤ect it.
2 The Basic Model
We rst lay out the rationale for the basic assumptions made. Then we setup the model and explain how
it works.
7Anonymous contests provide a non-strategic setting (analogous to that of monopolistic competition) as this makes more
sense in the education application we are interested in.
8For example, contests identify latent talent that might not otherwise be unearthed. The international Math Olympics
or the Putnam Exam in the US (administered by the Mathematical Association of America) for example allows students to
discover their math ability at an early age. See Kenderov (2006) for a discussion of the role of competitions on education
in mathematics.
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2.1 The Setup
Our basic setup makes a few assumptions. First, we posit that performance in the contest is related
to total ability which is seen as arising from native ability and acquired ability. This seems reasonable.
Both innate ability and training are needed for superior performance, though the extent to which one can
substitute for the other is an open question. In this context it is worth mentioning the super 30 program
in India which has attracted a lot of attention. Anand Kumar, an India Mathematician from humble
beginnings, started a program that tries to level the playing eld for scheduled caste/tribe students in the
Indian State of Bihar. It trains them to take the JEE (joint entrance exam) for entry into elite engineering
schools in India like the IITs (Indian Institutes of Technology).9 From 2002 onwards, 30 disadvantaged
students were chosen on the basis of an aptitude/ability test by the program. What is amazing is that
the program has consistently placed over 90%, and often 100% of them these elite institutions.10
The results of the super 30 program suggest that natural ability, once combined with some training
(acquired ability), yields large improvements in performance, i.e., the cross partial derivatives of perfor-
mance with respect to native and acquired ability are positive. We assume that groups may di¤er in
terms of the distribution of acquired ability as di¤erences in background create di¤erences in acquired
ability so that even if native ability is similarly distributed between groups as posited, total ability may
not be.
Second, we assume that (i) total ability and e¤ort give rise to performance in the exam, (ii) that
there is no randomness in outcomes, and (iii) that e¤ort to improve exam performance has no innate
value. That higher ability and e¤ort raise performance is uncontroversial. That there is no randomness
in exams is less so. After all, everyone has a bad day and this a¤ects performance. Or one may get lucky
and get exactly what one studied in the exam and do better than someone who focused on topics that
were not tested! Though randomness in performance complicates matters, in many ways our basic results
remain unchanged as discussed in Section 5. Finally, the assumption that studying for the exam has no
innate value needs some discussion. The education literature distinguishes between assessments based on
exams which encourage rote learning, where studying may have no innate value,11 and those based on
formative and authentic assessments. Formative assessments allow students to both develop their
abilities and assess their progress. They tend to integrate teaching and learning with assessment. Often,
they do not require formal grading, but a demonstration of the ability to complete some task. Authentic
assessments involve demonstration of ability in a real-world context. Studying for such exams may indeed
be valuable in itself. We show that even if agents obtain private benets from studying, what is critical
9The JEE is ercely competitive and at a very high level. It is said that it is harder to qualify in this exam than to get
into Harvard, MIT or Caltech! Smart upper middle class students with all the advantages of their background and training
routinely fail this exam, despite tutoring and maniacal e¤ort. There are preferences for backward castes and tribes that
make it much easier for them to get in.
10See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Super_30 for more on this.
11There is some evidence that high stakes testing does not improves student learning. See Amerein and Berliner (2002).
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to our arguments is that they study more than they would otherwise. This excessive e¤ort is what is
wasteful.12
Third, we assume that society values native ability more than the contest does. The contest allocates
seats according to the total ability of the agent. However, society would prefer that seats be allocated
to those most likely to contribute to the social good. It is reasonable to expect that agents with high
native ability are more likely to make the major breakthroughs of use to society than less able, but highly
groomed candidates. In other words, society would want Albert Einstein to be educated even if he was
bad at exams. Moreover, agents cannot internalize their social contribution so that there is a mismatch
between who gets in and who should get in.
2.2 The Specication
There is a continuum of heterogeneous agents, with measure one, who decide whether to take an exam
that will be used as the basis for admission. An agent is admitted if his performance exceeds a cuto¤
performance level denoted by ~P . This cuto¤ is determined in equilibrium to ll the available seats. We
assume that there is no randomness in outcomes.13
As there is a continuum of agents, the environment is non strategic. Agents take a summary statistic
(the cuto¤ score) as given, and maximize their objective function. In equilibrium the cuto¤ score assumed
is validated. This is analogous to models of monopolistic competition where rms take the aggregate price
index as given and make their choices (on pricing, entry, etc.) to maximize their prots, and where, in
equilibrium, the price index that rms take as given is exactly the price index that emerges from the
prot maximizing behavior of rms.14 While the body of the paper looks at admission to a single school,
we explain why the results generalize in Section 5 and show this in an Appendix that is available on
request.
Agents di¤er according to their abilities. Specically, we distinguish between two types of ability:
natural and acquired abilities. Natural ability is the ability an agent was born with, while acquired
ability is accumulated prior taking the exam (for instance, acquired in high school, or from tutoring).
The performance of an agent is denoted by P where:
P = f(aN + aA; e), (1)
where aN and aA are natural and acquired abilities respectively, a = aN+aA is total ability. For simplicity,
we assume that the two types of ability are perfect substitutes. Finally, e is the e¤ort undertaken by the
12We ignore any social benets of studying for the exam in this paper. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) suggests that such
externalities are limited, at least for secondary school.
13The e¤ects of dropping this assumption are discussed in Section 5.
14Formally, this is an anonymous game. The game is called anonymous because playerspreferences depend only on their
own actions and the distribution of all other agentsactions, i.e. on the aggregate behavior of all other agents, not on who
plays what.
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agent to pass the test. We assume that f(a; e) is increasing in both its arguments and the returns to
e¤ort in terms of performance are increasing in ability, i.e., fae()  0. Moreover, f(a; e) is concave in e:
fee  0. E¤ort has a private cost denoted by c(e); with c0() > 0 and c00()  0 and c(0) = 0. As e¤ort is
costly, this immediately implies that if an agent decides to take the exam, then the e¤ort expended will
be the minimum needed to attain the cuto¤ denoted by ~P: If he does not take the exam then his e¤ort
level is zero. Hence, the e¤ort level for agents who decide to take the exam is implicitly dened by e in
equation (2):
f(a; e) = ~P: (2)
Let this e¤ort level be denoted by e(a; ~P ).
Higher ability agents need to put in less e¤ort to attain a given performance cuto¤ so that e¤ort levels
are decreasing in ability. This follows from totally di¤erentiating equation (2) to get
@e(a; ~P )
@a
=  fa()
fe() < 0: (3)
Moreover, e¤ort rises as the performance cuto¤ rises,
@e(a; ~P )
@ ~P
=
1
fe(:)
> 0: (4)
2.3 Equilibrium
The private returns from education of an agent with ability a are given by s(a) T , where T is the tuition
level. Without loss of generality, the outside option is normalized to zero. In the text, we assume that
e¤ort expended in studying for the exam has no intrinsic value as it does not a¤ect the payo¤s, s(a),
which depend only on a. In the Appendix, we incorporate an intrinsic value of e¤ort by letting payo¤s
when educated depend on e¤ort and show that the essence of our results remains. Though e¤ort has two
roles in this augmented model; it raises payo¤s when educated and it helps you get in, only the former
has social value. When there are rents to be appropriated from getting in, agents exert more e¤ort than
socially optimal in order to be admitted which is wasteful.
An individual decides to take the exam if doing so is better than not doing so. That is, an agent with
total ability a takes the exam if and only if
s(a)  T  c(e(a; ~P )):
We assume that s(a) is increasing in a: more able individuals gain more from education.
Dene a by:
s(a)  T = c(e(a; ~P )).
The marginal agent (the agent with ability a) is indi¤erent between getting into university or not. Agents
with ability below the cuto¤ a choose not to put in the e¤ort required to pass the exam while students
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above this cuto¤ choose to put in the required e¤ort.15
We assume that the natural and acquired abilities are independently distributed across agents. The
distribution functions are given by HN (aN ) and HA(aA) on [0; aNmax] and [0; a
A
max], respectively. Then,
the distribution function for the total ability a is H(a) on [0; amax], where
H(a) =
Z aAmax
0
HN (a  y)dHA(y) (5)
and amax = aNmax + a
A
max.
16
The equilibrium in the model is determined by two conditions. First, the total mass of agents accepted
to the university equals the number of available seats. Second, the agent with ability a is indi¤erent
between going to university and not. The former condition means
1 H(a) = ; (6)
where  is the number of seats (which is exogenously given and strictly less then one). The latter
condition means that
s(a)  T = c(e(a; ~P )): (7)
Hence, we have two equations with two unknowns: a and ~P . In particular, we can solve (6) for a and
then, given a(), solve (7) for ~P .17 Since s(a) is increasing in a and e(a; ~P ) is decreasing, s(a)   T  
c(e(a; ~P )) is increasing in a: Note that the equilibrium value of a depends solely on , while ~P depends
not only on  but also on the tuition level T .
As depicted in Figure 1, in equilibrium, the e¤ort level is zero till ability a. At this point it jumps to
e(a; ~P ); the e¤ort required to get in. Then, e¤ort falls with ability and at some point may go to zero
as depicted if able enough agents can attain the performance cuto¤ with no e¤ort.18
The next lemma shows what happens if the number of seats is increased or the tuition level rises.
Lemma 1 A greater number of available seats or a higher tuition level decreases the performance cuto¤
~P: That is, d ~Pd < 0 and
d ~P
dT < 0. Moreover, a greater number of available seats reduces the ability cuto¤
though a higher tuition has no e¤ect on it. That is, da

d < 0 and
da
dT = 0:
15This corresponds to Siegel (2009) where the reach and power of an agent are critical in dening the equilibrium. In our
setup, the reach of an agent is the score at which his gain from admission is zero, the cuto¤ score or threshold is the
reach of the marginal agent, and the powerof an agent is his surplus from choosing a score equal to the threshold score.
This is also his payo¤ in equilibrium.
16Note that Pr(aN+aA  y) =
aA=a
max
AP
aA=0
Pr(aN < y aA) Pr(aA). Replacing the sum with the integral gives the equation.
In other words, the area under the line aN + aA = a, H(a), is the same as calculating the density of the population below
the line aN + aA = a at a given aA; (HN (a  aA)hA(aA)) and then integrating over all aA.
17We assume that the number of seats is small enough that an interior equilibrium occurs.
18As the cost of this e¤ort at a is just compensated for by the increase in earnings from going to university, the payo¤s
depicted in Figure 2 are continuous, though there may be a kink at a; the ability at which no e¤ort is needed to be
admitted. They are also increasing in ability.
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Proof. In the Appendix.
A greater number of seats lets agents with lower ability in (da

d < 0) and as there are more seats,
the cuto¤ performance falls d ~Pd < 0: In Figure 1, the e¤ort curve shifts down and to the left with the
marginal agent being of lower ability and putting in less e¤ort.
Similarly, a rise in the tuition level decreases the return from being educated of all agents at a given
e¤ort level. In order to make the marginal agent indi¤erent between getting in and not, the e¤ort need
to get in, and hence the performance cuto¤, must fall as the tuition rises (d ~PdT < 0). As the performance
cuto¤ falls, all agents need to put in less e¤ort to be admitted. In Figure 1, the e¤ort curve would shift
down, with the identity of the marginal agent being una¤ected (da

dT = 0), as the tuition rose.
Due to the lack of randomness in outcomes, agents are able to put in just the e¤ort needed to ensure
they attain the cuto¤ performance, ~P: However, since e¤ort does not improve ability, these e¤orts are
a social waste, even though they are privately valuable and are necessary to allocate seats.19 E¤ort
expended is then the maximum of the e¤ort needed to get in and the e¤ort chosen for other reasons.
E¤ort is excessive when the e¤ort needed to get in exceeds that which would be chosen for other reasons.
As the e¤ort needed to get in falls with ability, unless the e¤ort chosen for other reasons falls even faster
(which is hard to motivate) lower ability agents are the ones who expend excessive e¤ort and the essence
of our results goes through. See the Appendix for details.
2.4 Social Welfare
We postulate that natural ability is more important than acquired ability for society. To capture this we
assume that the social gains from education of an agent with abilities aN and aA are given by s(aN+aA),
where  2 [0; 1]. Here,  represents the relative importance of the acquired ability for the society. If 
is equal to zero, then the society cares only about natural ability. If  is equal to one, then natural and
acquired abilities are of the same importance for the society. Social welfare is obtained by integrating
social surplus over those with total ability over the cuto¤ level a.
W =
Z
aN+aAa

s(aN + aA)  c(e(aN + aA; ~P ))  F

dHN (aN )dHA(aA); (8)
where F is the social cost of education per student. As tuition is a lump-sum transfer, T does not directly
a¤ect welfare. It only a¤ects it via the e¤ort put in by agents. In addition, as there is no uncertainty in
our setup, agents below the cuto¤ ability do not expend any e¤ort.
Given the number of seats, there are two distortions in the economy. In the model, the e¤ort expended
to pass the exam is determined by the tuition level: if the tuition is low, then getting in is very valuable
and the performance cuto¤ is high. To make the cuto¤, much e¤ort is needed. This e¤ort is wasteful
19While assuming e¤orts have no e¤ect on ability or payo¤s might seem a bit extreme, it is not an unreasonable char-
acterization of many entrance exams which involve studying for the test and emphasize memorization rather than deep
understanding. In addition, relaxing this assumption does not change the avor of the results as shown in the Appendix.
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which results in welfare losses. In (8), this loss is equal to c(e(aN + aA; ~P )) for an agent with ability
a = aN + aA.
The other distortion, given the number of seats, arises due to social benet deviating from private
benet. In particular, it is optimal for society that the agents with the highest social benet get in.
However, in practice, those with the highest private gain enter. For example, if admission is on the basis
of exam performance, and the latter depends on the sum of natural and acquired ability, but social benet
comes from a function that puts more weight on natural ability than acquired ability, then the wrong
people will be admitted. Note that, in the rst best case, the number of seats should be set so that the
social cost of an additional seat equals the social benet generated. If the number of seats di¤ers from
this level there are welfare costs.
Next, we explore the e¤ects of the tuition level and the number of seats on social welfare. In many
countries the best public education is much cheaper and often far better than private education. However,
it is rationed by strict performance cuto¤s. In India, for example, until recently, all higher education
institutions were public, close to free, and seats were allocated by performance in a school leaving exam.
Even now, the best colleges remain public. The alternative to a bad domestic placement is to go abroad,
where admission to comparable institutions is much easier, and to pay non-resident tuition. As a result,
those going abroad to study from India seem to fall into two categories: those admitted with funding
who tend go to the best places abroad, and those without funding who pay their own way, often at less
prestigious places as the best places fund whoever cannot pay. Turkey has a similar system. In fact, in
most continental European countries, higher education is public and free. In some countries, students
even get a government stipend to go to school. It is easy to see that this system encourages agents to
put in more e¤ort than is socially optimal when the number of seats is small.
Next we build our understanding of the model by rst considering what happens when  = 1 and
nd the optimal tuition level given the number of seats and the optimal number of seats. Then we look
at the e¤ect of  6= 1:
2.4.1 Optimal Tuition and Seats with  = 1
We show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 For any given number of seats, the welfare maximizing tuition elicits zero e¤ort from the
marginal agent. When  = 1; that is the society values native and acquired ability equally, and conditional
on no preferences, the rst best can be achieved by setting tuition at the full cost of education and setting
the number of seats so that all seats are demanded and the marginal agent puts in no e¤ort.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. An increase in T has no a¤ect on the identity of
the marginal agent as long as the equilibrium e¤ort level of the marginal agent is positive. In addition,
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as it is a transfer, it has no direct e¤ect on welfare. Its welfare consequences arise through its e¤ects on
agents actions. As an increase in T reduces the payo¤s from admission, it reduces the e¤ort expended by
the marginal agent (whose identity is unchanged by the tuition increase) and so reduces the performance
cuto¤. This reduction in the performance cuto¤ in turn reduces the e¤ort each agent choosing to become
educated needs to incur, which raises welfare. This is the case until T is such that zero e¤ort is expended
by the marginal agent. In this way, the optimal tuition removes the distortion caused by wasted e¤orts.
The optimal tuition level, T opt, is given by
T opt = s(a) (9)
and the equilibrium performance cuto¤ is determined by
e(a; ~P ) = 0 () ~P = f(a; 0):
It is worth noting that higher tuition does have a redistributive e¤ect. The least able agents are
una¤ected as the alternative to going to university is the same and they are indi¤erent between these
two options. The more able lose from an increase in tuition. When tuition rises, there are two e¤ects on
the payo¤s from education (given by s(a)   T   c(e(a; ~P ))). First, keeping e¤ort xed, the increase in
tuition shifts the surplus curve down in a parallel fashion. Second, less e¤ort is expended by all agents in
order to get in (as ~P falls) and this shifts the surplus curve up till the surplus of agent a is again zero.
As the less able put in more e¤ort, this fall in e¤ort is more valuable to them, so that the shift up is
greater for less able agents and this attens the surplus curve. As a result, individual welfare falls with
tuition increases, and more so for the more able. Figure 3 illustrates this reasoning. Of course, as wasted
e¤ort is reduced, social welfare rises.
2.5 Bringing in Selection
As discussed above, the distortion caused by wasted e¤ort can be eliminated by setting a su¢ ciently high
tuition level. However, the distortion caused by selection into education can not be completely removed.
Only the agents with the highest social gains from education should ll the available seats. Specically,
given the number of seats to be lled, agents with abilities aN and aA, such that s(aN + aA)  b,
should be accepted where b is determined byZ
s(aN+aA)b
dHN (aN )dHA(aA) = :
However, competition results in the acceptance condition aN + aA  a. As a result, some agents, who
should not be accepted to the university, are accepted and vice versa, which in turn leads to welfare
losses.
Figure 4 illustrates the distortion for the case when s 1(b) < a < s 1(b)=. In Figure 4, agents
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Figure 3: Payo¤s from Education: a Rise in T
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with abilities in the triangle aBs 1(b) should be accepted to the university on the basis of maximizing
social welfare, but they do not apply, as their individual gains from education are less than their outside
option. Instead, agents with abilities in the triangle aB s 1(b)= take the exam and get in, while the
social gains from their education are lower than those of the agents in the triangle aBs 1(b). As the
cuto¤ ability a is determined by the number of seats , the optimal choice of  can limit the welfare
losses caused by the selection distortion, but can not completely eliminate them.
Notice that if  is equal to one, private gains are equal to social gains, so that the rst best outcome
can be achieved. Specically, the number of seats should be such that only agents with s(aN + aA)  F
take the exam, which implies that the equilibrium value of a must be equal to s 1(F ). In this case, the
optimal number of seats, opt, is such that the solution a(opt) of
1 H(a) = opt
is equal to s 1(F ). Finally, the optimal tuition T opt in this case is equal to the social cost of education,
F .
3 Reservations and Welfare
In this section, we ask if there is a case for treating groups of agents di¤erently. We assume there are two
groups of agents indexed by i 2 f1; 2g, which have identical distributions of natural ability and potentially
di¤erent distributions of acquired ability. The latter is motivated by the fact that agents with di¤erent
social backgrounds have had di¤erent educational inputs prior to taking the exam, which in turn results
in di¤erent acquired abilities on their part. In particular, we assume that H1N (aN ) = H
2
N (aN )  HN (aN ),
while H1A(aA) LR H2A(aA) where LR stands for the likelihood stochastic order. Hence,
h1A(aA)
h1A(x)
>
h2A(aA)
h2A(x)
for any aA; x : aA > x.
This means that group 1 is more favored in terms of acquired ability than group 2. In addition, we
assume that the distribution of natural ability has a log-concave density. This assumption is needed to
ensure the likelihood stochastic order of the distributions of total ability: i.e., H1(a) LR H2(a).20
The share of each group in the total mass of agents (which is normalized to unity) is denoted by
i, where 1 + 2 = 1. A share of available seats is reserved for each group of agents. We denote this
reservation quota by i, where 1 + 2 = 1. If these quotas are binding, then the cuto¤s for the two
groups will di¤er.
Rewriting the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) to reect this, let
Hi(a) =
Z aAmax;i
0
HN (a  y)dHiA(y) i = 1; 2: (10)
20See Theorem 1.C.9 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for the proof. This assumption is not very restrictive, as a
number of commonly used distributions such as the normal, uniform, Gamma, and Beta distributions satisfy it.
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where aAmax;i is the upper bound of H
i
A(aA). Then
i
 
1 Hi(ai )

= i; (11)
s(ai )  T = c(e(ai ; ~Pi)); where i = 1; 2: (12)
Here, ai is the total ability of the marginal agent from group i and ~Pi is the performance cuto¤ for agents
from group i.
Having binding reservations is equivalent to setting di¤erent performance cuto¤s across groups for
acceptance to the university. Social welfare in this case is given by
W (:) = 1
Z
aN+aAa1

s(aN + aA)  c(e(aN + aA; ~P1))  F

dHN (aN )dH
1
A(aA)
+2
Z
aN+aAa2

s(aN + aA)  c(e(aN + aA; ~P2))  F

dHN (aN )dH
2
A(aA):
Next, we explore how imposing reservations a¤ects social welfare. To reduce notation, let 2 = , so
that 1 = 1   . The reservation quota  has two e¤ects on the social welfare. First, changes in  have
an impact on the performance cuto¤s ~P1 and ~P2 and, therefore, on the e¤ort put in by the agents. For
example, a rise in  (i.e. more seats for the underprivilegedsecond group) decreases ~P2 and increases
~P1. This in turn implies that agents from group 2 need to put in less e¤ort, while agents from group 1
need to put in more e¤ort to get in. We call this the e¤ort e¤ect on the social welfare. Second, there
is an impact on selection into education, as a1 and a

2 are a¤ected by  as well. Specically, a rise in
 decreases a2 and increases a

1. That is, more agents from group 2 and fewer agents from group 1 are
accepted. We call this the selection e¤ect. Hence, we have the following:
dW (a1; a

2;
~P1; ~P2)
d
=
"
@W (a1; a

2;
~P1; ~P2)
@ ~P1
@ ~P1
@
+
@W (a1; a

2;
~P1; ~P2)
@ ~P2
@ ~P2
@
#
+
"
@W (a1; a

2;
~P1; ~P2)
@a1
@a1
@
+
@W (a1; a

2;
~P1; ~P2)
@a2
@a2
@
#
= EE + SE;
where EE and SE stand for the e¤ort (changes in  a¤ect the performance cuto¤ and via it e¤ort)
and selection e¤ects (changes in  a¤ect the total ability cuto¤ and a¤ect selection) on the welfare,
respectively. In the Appendix, we derive exact expressions for EE and SE:
3.1 Identical Groups
Before we proceed to the analysis of the general case, we rst ask whether there is a case for slight
preferences if the groups of agents are the same: i.e., H1A(aA)  H2A(aA); even if social and private
benets from education di¤er. Not surprisingly, the answer is no. The intuition is that on the margin,
the gains of one group are exactly made up for by the losses of the other in this case.
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Let us dene the non-discrimination quota as the quota which results from market clearing so that
~P1 = ~P2. Note that this immediately implies that a1 = a

2. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 If H1A(aA)  H2A(aA), then whatever be ; welfare is locally unchanged in response to
the quota when it is set at the non-discrimination level, i.e., such that i = i.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition behind this is straightforward. Given a change in , agents in one group have their
performance cuto¤ fall (the cuto¤ falls by more if the group is small so that asymmetry in the size of the
groups does not a¤ect this result), which reduces the e¤ort for all abilities and raises the welfare of this
group. The opposite happens for the other group. If the initial equilibrium is non discriminatory and the
groups have the same distributions, then the gains to one group exactly cancel the losses to the other so
that welfare is unchanged. In other words, the e¤ort e¤ect evaluated at the non-discrimination quota is
equal to zero. Similarly, there is no e¤ect on the total welfare through selection. The welfare losses due
to the selection e¤ect of one group are completely o¤set by the gains of the other group.
Even though welfare does not change when a marginal quotais imposed when groups are identical
in their acquired as well as native abilities, this does not mean that quotas are always welfare reducing
with identical groups. Strictly binding quotas may well raise welfare. The reason is that under certain
conditions, the non-discrimination quota gives a minimum, not a maximum of welfare! We explore this
result using simulations in the next section.
3.2 Non Identical Groups
When groups are not identical, even marginal quotas can a¤ect welfare. That is, starting from a point
where the two groups have the same cuto¤, but di¤er in terms of their ability distributions, discriminating
in favor of one group can raise the social welfare. To better understand when this can occur we evaluate
the e¤ort and selection e¤ects (EE and SE) when the initial equilibrium is non discriminatory. We show
that the e¤ort e¤ect is negative, which calls for discrimination against the weaker group, but that the
selection e¤ect is positive which calls for discrimination in favor of the weaker group.
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 3 If H1A(aA) LR H2A(aA), and the distribution of natural ability has a log-concave density,
then the e¤ort e¤ect of discriminating in favor of the weaker group (group 2), evaluated at the non-
discrimination quota, is negative. That is,
EE= < 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
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Moving seats from group 1 to group 2 increases the performance cuto¤ for group 1 and decreases it
for group 2, implying that agents from group 1 put in more e¤ort to get in, while agents from group 2
put in less e¤ort. As the distribution of total ability in group 1 stochastically dominates that in group
2, in the non-discrimination equilibrium, agents from group 1 put in less e¤ort on average than agents
from group 2. As a result, discriminating in favor of group 2 (a rise in ) raises total wasted e¤ort and
decreases the social welfare compared to the non-discrimination equilibrium.
Next we examine the selection e¤ect evaluated at the non-discrimination quota. Specically, the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 4 If H1A(aA) LR H2A(aA), then the selection e¤ect of discriminating in favor of the weaker
group (group 2) evaluated at the non-discrimination quota is positive. That is,
SE= > 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition is simple. When group 2 is more disadvantaged in terms of acquired ability, those agents
from group 2 who do get must on average have a higher average natural ability.21 In fact, we can show
that if H1A(aA) LR H2A(aA), then in the non-discrimination equilibrium, the distribution of natural
ability among agents from group 2 accepted to the university stochastically dominates (in the likelihood
ratio order) that among accepted agents from group 1:22 Since likelihood ratio dominance ensures rst
order stochastic dominance, accepted agents from group 2 have a higher natural ability on average than
do accepted agents from group 1. As society cares more about the natural ability, than does the exam,
a quota in favor of group 2 increases welfare by raising the average natural ability of admitted students.
From the above considerations, we can see that a quota in favor of the disadvantaged group can
decrease or increase welfare depending on the magnitudes of the e¤ort and selection e¤ects. Group 2 is
the disadvantaged group (because of a worse distribution of acquired ability), and reservations in favor
of this group make sense as they allow talented but poorly educated agents to get higher education (the
selection e¤ect in the model). However, this comes at a cost, as agents from the disadvantaged group put
in on average more e¤ort (the e¤ort e¤ect), which is socially useless. If the selection e¤ect dominates, as
is likely when  is low so that acquired ability is worth little to society, then discriminating in favor of
the disadvantaged is socially optimal. If  is close to 1, so that acquired ability can easily compensate
for native ability in social welfare, then it is actually optimal to discriminate against the less advantaged!
In the next section we explore when discriminating in favor of the less advantages is welfare improving
using a parametric model as an example as well as simulations.
21This is the equivalent of saying in casual conversation that if someone from a bad High School got into Harvard, he/she
must be really good!
22The proof is available on request.
20
4 Example and Simulations
In this section we look at an example and some simulations to better understand the model and its
implications for policy.
4.1 A Special Case
We parametrize the model to derive a closed-form solution and thereby compare the magnitudes of the
e¤ort and selection e¤ects. To simplify the analysis, we assume linearity so s(a) = Sa, f(a; e) = a + e,
and c(e) = Ce, where S and C are parameters. In this case, the e¤ort put in is given by
e(a; ~P ) = max

~P   a; 0

;
which implies that agents with total ability greater than ~P do not put in any e¤ort. The equilibrium
conditions under the non-discrimination quota are given by
1
 
1 H1(a)+ 2  1 H2(a) = ; (13)
Sa   T   C

~P   a

= 0; (14)
where the rst equation determines the cuto¤ of total ability, a, while the second one determines the
performance cuto¤:
~P =
(S + C)a   T
C
:
We also assume that both types of ability are uniformly distributed across the agents. That is,
HN (aN ) = aN=a
N
max on

0; aNmax

and HiA(aA) = aA=a
A
max;i on

0; aAmax;i

where aAmax;1  aAmax;2. Note
that under this assumption, H1A(aA) LR H2A(aA) (but H1A(aA) 1 H2A(aA)) so that our assumption
about the likelihood stochastic order does not hold anymore. However, as shown below, with uniform
distributions of abilities, rst-order stochastic dominance is su¢ cient for all the results formulated in the
previous section to hold.
In equilibrium, the marginal ability a is pinned down by the number of seats  (see (13)). In our
analysis, we consider the case when a  aNmax and a  aAmax;i for i = 1; 2. That is, the number of seats
is so low that an agent needs both types of ability to get in. Next, we derive explicit expressions for the
e¤ort and selection e¤ects evaluated at the non-discrimination quota.
Proposition 5 The e¤ort and selection e¤ects evaluated at the non-discrimination quota are given by
EE= =   (S + C)
2
0B@aAmax;1   aAmax;2 +

amax;2  min( ~P; amax;2)
2
amax;2   a  

amax;1  min( ~P; amax;1)
2
amax;1   a
1CA ,
SE= =
(1  )S  aAmax;1   aAmax;2
2
,
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where
amax;i = a
A
max;i + a
N
max:
Proof. In the Appendix.
As can be seen, the magnitude of the e¤ort e¤ect positively depends on the parameters describing the
returns from education and the cost of e¤ort, S and C. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that the
magnitude of the e¤ort e¤ect is increasing in the performance cuto¤ ~P . Indeed, if ~P < amax;i for i = 1; 2,
so that some of both abilities get in, then
EE= =   (S + C)
2

~P   a
2 aAmax;1   aAmax;2
(amax;2   a) (amax;1   a) ,
which is negative and decreasing in ~P . If amax;2  ~P  amax;1, then
EE= =   (S + C)
2
0B@aAmax;1   aAmax;2  

amax;1   ~P
2
amax;1   a
1CA ;
which is also decreasing in ~P . Finally, if ~P > amax;1, then the e¤ort e¤ect is given by
EE= =   (S + C)
2
 
aAmax;1   aAmax;2

;
and, therefore, does not depend on ~P . Thus, all else equal, the e¤ort e¤ect is strictly decreasing in ~P on
[a; amax;1) and then is at with respect to ~P .
The selection e¤ect depends only on S and the parameter  that describes the di¤erence between the
social and private gains from education. Note that if ~P > amax;1, the overall e¤ect on social welfare is
negative:
@W
@ =
= EE= + SE= =  

 
aAmax;1   aAmax;2

2
(S + C) :
In this case, the e¤ort e¤ect dominates over the selection e¤ect. Hence, we can conclude that, for
su¢ ciently high values of the performance cuto¤ (which represents the level of competition for seats,
which in turn depends on tuition and the availability of seats), the e¤ort e¤ect is stronger than the
selection e¤ect and, as a result, a quota in favor of disadvantaged results in welfare losses. Whereas, for
su¢ ciently low values of ~P , the selection e¤ect prevails over the e¤ort e¤ect and a reservation quota in
favor of disadvantaged can increase the social welfare. Note that the tuition fee T a¤ects the e¤ort and
selection e¤ects only through ~P . Moreover, a rise in T reduces the performance cuto¤ ~P . Thus, we know:
Proposition 6 There exists a value of the tuition fee, T tr, such that an increase in the quota for the
disadvantaged group evaluated at the non-discrimination level, ; raises welfare if and only if T > T tr.
Intuitively, a higher tuition level reduces the magnitude of the e¤ort e¤ect and, as a result, a quota
in favor of the disadvantaged is more likely to be welfare improving. For this reason, the model suggests
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that a¢ rmative action is likely to reduce welfare in a setting where education is subsidized. In India,
for example, backward castes and tribes have a share of seats (given by their population share) reserved
for them in publicly funded higher education. These reservations result in cuto¤ entrance exam scores
that are much lower for these groups than for the general category.23 As public higher education is
not only much cheaper than private, and as the very best institutions are public and seats are scarce,
competition to get in is extreme. In such a setting, reservations are likely to be welfare reducing. Higher
education is also subsidized in many European countries. However, supply is abundant, and as a result,
e¤ort expended to get in is far less than in the Indian context. In the U.S., State Universities tend to be
cheaper than private ones of a similar quality. However, the emphasis on need blind admissions and the
availability of nancial aid signicantly reduces the di¤erence in price.
In the next section we turn to some simulations that help us better understand the model. We continue
to use the linear setup used in the example in our simulations.
4.2 Simulations
In this subsection, we simulate the model for a number of di¤erent values of the parameters. In particular,
we assume that the production function f(a; e) and the payo¤ function s(a) are again linear: f(a; e) =
a+ e and s(a) = Sa. In this case,
e(a; ~Pi) = max(0; ~Pi   a):
In addition, we assume that the cost of e¤ort is quadratic: c(e) = Ce2. As a result, the equilibrium
conditions are given by
i
 
1 Hi(ai )

= i;
Sai   T = C

max(0; ~Pi   ai )
2
for i = 1; 2:
The rst condition gives the ability cuto¤ for each group, while the second equates the benet from getting
in with its full cost for the marginal agent and denes the cuto¤ performance level for each group. Note
that the above implies that a proportional change in S, T , and C does not change either the cuto¤ ability
or the performance cuto¤. Therefore, we set C and T to one and leave S to vary in the simulations. We
also assume that F = 1. In fact, the choice of F does not a¤ect the qualitative implications of the model,
as changes in F only shift the welfare function downward or upward and do not a¤ect the equilibrium.
In our simulations, we assume that the distributions of natural and acquired ability take a Gamma
form. A Gamma distribution has a density function:
f(x; ; ) =
1

1
 ()
x 1e x=:
23 In the celebrated Indian Institutes of Technology, the entrance exam marks for the general category are in the high
nineties and while they are in the low fties for the reserved category.
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It is characterized by the shape parameter  and the scale parameter . It has a mean of  and a variance
of 2: There are two advantages of using a Gamma distribution. First, a Gamma distribution has the
following property: if Xi has a Gamma distribution with i and , then
P
i
Xi has a Gamma distribution
with
P
i
i and . That is, if the distributions of natural and acquired ability are Gamma with the same
scale parameter, then the distribution of total ability is Gamma as well. The second advantage is that
if the shape parameter  is less than or equal to one, then the density function is decreasing, i.e., the
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) is concave. For  = 1, we have the exponential distribution as
a special case. Its c.d.f. is also concave. However, for  > 1; the density at zero is zero, and the density
function is rst increasing and then decreasing. Thus, the cumulative density is locally convex and then
concave. This property is important, as the curvature of the c.d.f. of total ability seems to determine
the curvature of the welfare function (see the experiments below). We will assume that  = 1 for all
distributions. Then, the density functions are given by
hN (aN ) =
1
 (N )
xN 1e x;
hiA(aA) =
1
 (iA)
x
i
A 1e x; and
hi(a) =
1
 (iA + N )
x
i
A+N 1e x;
where N and 
i
A take on di¤erent values in the simulations. Table 1 summarizes the parametrization.
Parameters that are varied in the simulations are in italics.
It is useful to write welfare slightly di¤erently as done below. Given the form we use, welfare is easily
broken down into its value when  = 1 plus an adjustment factor to account for the di¤erent weights
placed on acquired ability by society and by individual agents. Specically,
W =
X
i
i
Z
aN+aAai

s(aN + aA)  c(e(aN + aA; ~Pi))  F

dHN (aN )dH
i
A(aA)
=
X
i
i
Z amax;i
ai

Sa  c(e(a; ~Pi))  T

dHi(a)
 (1  )S
X
i
i
Z aAmax;i
0
aA (1 HN (ai   aA))dHiA(aA) +  (T   F ) :
Note that we use the fact that s(:) is linear in the above. The rst part in the expression above stands
for private welfare, which is the sum of the private payo¤s from being educated. Let us call this PW for
private welfare. The second term in the welfare function, which is given by
SC =  (1  )S
X
i
i
Z aAmax;i
0
aA (1 HN (ai   aA))dHiA(aA) +  (T   F ) ,
is the di¤erence between social welfare and private welfare. For instance, if the private gains from
education are equal to the social gains (i.e.,  is equal to one), then the welfare is equal to private welfare
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Table 1: Parametrization
Variable Parametrization
Score Production Function: f(a; e) = a+ e
Cost of E¤ort: c(e) = Ce2; C = 1
Tuition: T = 1
Social Cost of Education: F = 1
Scale Parameter of Gamma:  = 1
Share of Population in Group i : 1 = 2 = 0:5
Shape Parameters of Gamma: iA; i = 1; 2: N = :5
Payo¤ Function: s(a) = Sa
Weight on Acquired Ability in Welfare: 
Share of Seats in Group i : i; i = 1; 2
Seats Available: 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if T = F: We call this term the "selection" component of welfare and denote it by SC. Thus,
W = PW + SC.
Next, we construct the welfare as a function of quota  for di¤erent values of

; S; ; iA
	
i=1;2
.
4.2.1 Simulations with only the E¤ort E¤ect
In this subsection, we consider the case when  is equal to one. In this case, social welfare is given by
W = PW +  (T   F ) =
X
i
i
Z amax;i
ai

Sa  c(e(a; ~Pi))

dHi(a)  F:
We examine two subcases: when the groups have identical distributions of acquired ability (the symmetric
case) and when the groups are di¤erent in terms of the distributions of acquired ability (the asymmetric
case).24
The Symmetric Case When the groups are identical (1A = 
2
A), our analytical results show that the
derivative of welfare with respect to the quota, evaluated at the non-discrimination quota, is equal to
zero (see Proposition 2). This implies that if the welfare function is concave (or single-peaked), then
the non-discrimination quota is optimal. Recall that the non-discrimination quota when the groups are
symmetric is equal to the size of each group (given by i). Simulations verify this result when N+
i
A  1;
which ensures that the c.d.f. of total ability is concave which seems to make the welfare function concave
as well.
When N + 
i
A > 1, interesting things happen. In the gures in this section, the horizontal axis is the
quota in favor of the disadvantaged group. In Figures 5 and 6, we consider the case when 1A = 
2
A = 1.
In this case, the shape parameter of the distribution of total ability is 1:5 and, therefore, the c.d.f. is not
concave, nor is welfare. The values of S are 110 and 130 in Figure 5 and 6, respectively. The welfare
function still has a zero derivative at the non-discrimination quota (as predicted), but this could deliver
a local minimum rather than a local maximum.
As can be seen from Figures 5 and 6, there are two global maxima so that it is optimal to discriminate
in favor of one group or the other as the two groups are of the same size. In Figure 5 it is optimal not to
give all seats to one group. As S rises, we move to Figure 6 and it becomes optimal to exclude one group
completely.
Why does this happen? Let us consider what happens, for example, when we move a seat from group
1 to group 2 when the density function is decreasing at the cuto¤ ability under the non-discrimination
quota. As a result of this, the cuto¤ score for group 2 falls and that for group 1 rises, and the ability of
the marginal agent rises in group 1 and falls in group 2. As the density function is decreasing in ability
at the cuto¤ ability, the cuto¤ for group 2 falls by a smaller amount than the cuto¤ for group 1 increases
24Note that only the distribution of total ability matters for welfare in this case.
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Figure 5: Social Welfare (no selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 1,  = 0:3, 1A = 
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A = 1, and S = 110.
Figure 6: Social Welfare (no selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 1,  = 0:3, 1A = 
2
A = 1, and S = 130.
even when the two groups are of the same size (as illustrated in Figure 7). This happens because there
are fewer agents to the right of the cuto¤ (as the density is decreasing) than to the left. The more the
cuto¤ falls (rises) the more the e¤ort expended falls (rises). As a result, the increase in e¤ort by the
agents in group 1 (which reduces surplus and so welfare) is more than the decrease in e¤ort by agents
in group 2 (which raises surplus and welfare). Consequently, welfare falls as this reallocation is made so
that non discrimination is optimal.
This is depicted in Figure 8. The surplus
s(a)  c(e(a; ~Pi))  T
is zero for the marginal agent and is increasing in ability. With the above reallocation the e¤ort function
for group 2 shifts down while that for group 1 shifts up so that their surplus moves in the opposite
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Figure 7: Decreasing Density: Cuto¤ E¤ects
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Figure 8: Decreasing Density: Surplus Changes
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Figure 9: Increasing Density: Cuto¤ E¤ects
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direction from their e¤ort. As can be seen, the total losses of group 1 (the area Ca1a
B) are greater than
the total gains of group 2 (the area Aa2a
B).
However, if the density function is increasing in ability at the cuto¤ability under the non-discrimination
quota, then the opposite happens (see Figure 9). The increase in e¤ort by the agents in group 1 (which
reduces welfare) is less than the decrease in e¤ort by agents in group 2 (which raises welfare), so that
welfare rises as this reallocation is made. Thus, non discrimination is a minimum of welfare not a max-
imum as depicted in Figures 5 and 6. To summarize, if the density function has a single peak (like the
normal distribution), then whether welfare locally rises or falls depends on what side of the peak the non
discrimination cuto¤ ability lies. Of course, this cuto¤ falls as the number of available seats rises.
Our argument also explains why greater discrimination is optimal when S rises (see Figures 5 and
6). As S rises, the e¤ort expended to get in rises and this is increasingly costly due to the convex cost
of e¤ort posited. As a result, the saving from reduced e¤ort by discriminating in favor of one group is
higher and more discrimination is called for as S rises.
Armed with this understanding let us see what happens when  rises from being 0:3. At  = 0:3; we
have two peaks as in Figure 5. It may actually become optimal to exclude one group or the other as 
rises. The reason is that giving all the seats to one group reduces the e¤ort of that group a lot. It also
makes the e¤ort of the other group zero as that group has no seats. This is what is depicted in Figure 10
for  = 0:5: If  is even higher, then if all seats are given to one group, there may not be enough agents
in this group who wish to avail themselves of the seats (given the tuition level) so that some seats are
wasted. In this case, giving fewer seats to this group will raise welfare as depicted in Figure 11 where
 = 0:8.
Figure 10: Social Welfare (no selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 1,  = 0:5, 1A = 
2
A = 1, and S = 110.
More generally, the simulations suggest that even when there are no di¤erences between agents, it
may be welfare increasing to create them by allowing some agents access to education while denying it
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Figure 11: Social Welfare (no selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 1,  = 0:8, 1A = 
2
A = 1, and S = 110.
to others. By granting a smaller share of agents access, surplus per capita in the resulting competition is
higher, though of course, the number granted access is lower. What happens to total welfare depends on
how fast surplus per capita rises as access is restricted, i.e., its elasticity. This observation is interesting
in terms of policy. In practice, di¤erential access to education is the norm and the welfare implications of
such di¤erential access is poorly understood. Advantaged groups tend to have better access to education
than others. For example, the better o¤ and better connected may have superior information about how
and where to apply. These simulations suggest a novel reason why (even when groups are identical ex
ante) di¤erential access (perhaps via a lottery) may be welfare improving.
The Asymmetric Case If groups have di¤erent distributions of acquired ability and  is equal to
one, then, by Propositions 3 and 4, the derivative of the social welfare function at the non-discrimination
quota is negative. If the welfare function is concave, this means that the optimal quota should be smaller
than the non discrimination quota25 , i.e., it should discriminate in favor of the advantaged group. Thus,
in this case,  should be less than non discrimination level.
Under our parametrization, H1A(aA) LR H2A(aA) if 1A > 2A. In our experiments, we assume that
1A = 0:5; 
2
A = 0:2, and N = 0:5: Thus, 
i
A + N < 1 implying that the density functions of total ability
for both groups are decreasing. We also assume that the groups are of the same size: 1 = 2 = 0:5.
Then, the non-discrimination quota solves the following system of equations:8<:  = 1  1H1(a)  2H2(a) = 2(1 H2(a))=:
The rst equation sets demand for seats under non discrimination equal to the supply to obtain the
common cuto¤. The second equation sets the fraction of seats that go to the less privileged group at this
25Recall that  is the quota in favor of the disadvantaged group.
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common cuto¤ equal, by denition, to the non-discrimination quota. Given the values of the parameters,
the non-discrimination quota is equal to 0:3932.
Figures 12 and 13 depict the welfare function for di¤erent values of S. In Figure 12, S = 10 and in
Figure 13, S = 100. As expected, the optimal quota is always less than the non-discrimination quota (as
suggested by the theory). Moreover, as can be seen in 12 and 13, the higher is S, the lower the optimal
quota. This is explained by the fact that a higher S implies higher performance cuto¤s and, thereby,
more e¤ort put in by the agents. This in turn increases the welfare losses due to wasted e¤ort. As a
result, a larger quota for the advantaged group (which on average put in less e¤ort) is optimal as S rises.
Figure 12: Social Welfare (no selection e¤ect, the asymmetric case)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
theta
so
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
The parametrization:  = 1,  = 0:3, 1A = 0:5, 
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A = 0:2, and S = 10.
Figure 13: Social Welfare (no selection e¤ect, the asymmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 1,  = 0:3, 1A = 0:5, 
2
A = 0:2, and S = 100.
Note that if the distributions of total ability were not concave, then, similar to the symmetric case,
the welfare function could be not concave as well. However, in this case, imposing a quota in favor of the
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advantaged group is still optimal, though the optimal quota is very likely to be equal to zero, i.e., it is
optimal to ban the disadvantaged group.
4.2.2 Simulations with the Selection E¤ect
In this subsection, we assume that  is strictly less than one. In this case, the selection component of
the welfare is not zero and, as a result, the optimal quota comes from the interplay of the e¤ort and
selection e¤ects. In particular, the selection e¤ect provides a rationale to discriminate in favor of the less
advantaged group. We will rst consider the symmetric case.
The Symmetric Case When the distribution of acquired ability is the same in both groups, the
selection e¤ect evaluated at the non-discrimination quota is equal to zero. This implies that if the total
welfare function is concave, then the non-discrimination quota is optimal. Figure 14 illustrates this
idea. It depicts the welfare function for the following set of parameters: 1A = 
2
A = 0:4, N = 0:5,
1 = 2 = 0:5, S = 10,  = 0:3, and  = 0:5. As can be seen, the non-discrimination quota maximizes
the welfare.
Figure 14: Social Welfare (with the selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 0:5,  = 0:3, 1A = 
2
A = 0:4, and S = 10.
However, in this case it is not enough for the density function to be decreasing for total welfare to be
concave. The selection part of the welfare is an additional source of non-concavity of the welfare function
(besides the non-concavity of the distributions of total ability). Even though, the distributions of total
ability are concave (as in this example), the presence of the selection part of the welfare can make the
welfare function non-concave. The idea behind this is as follows. The selection part of welfare is given by
SW =  (1  )S
X
i
i
Z aAmax;i
0
aA (1 HN (ai   aA))dHiA(aA) +  (T   F ) ,
which according to our experiments is usually convex in . Thus, the welfare function is the sum of a
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concave (the private component of welfare) and convex (the selection component of welfare) function.
As a result, the curvature of the social welfare function is not pinned down when  < 1 even if private
welfare is concave. Moreover, the lower is the value of , the more likely it is that the convex component
dominates, so that the social welfare function is not concave.
Figure 15 depicts the private part of the welfare (the upper curve) and the negative of the selection
components of welfare taken ( SW ) for  = 0. As can be inferred, both of these curves are concave with
a maximum at the non-discrimination quota. However, the welfare function is the di¤erence between
these two curves and, therefore, could be convex or concave. Figure 16 depicts the resulting total welfare
function which, as can be seen, is maximized at the corners.
Figure 15: Private and Selection Components of Welfare (the symmetric case)
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Figure 16: Social Welfare (with the selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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 = 0,  = 0:3, 1A = 
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Thus, if agents are symmetric, the density of ability is decreasing, and  is close to unity, then (by
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continuity arguments) no discrimination will be optimal as depicted in Figure 14. If  is very small, so
that acquired ability does not matter, then giving all the seats to one group or the other could be optimal.
When is such a policy optimal? Intuitively, if there is a lot of wasted e¤ort (wasted e¤ort is large
when S is high and/or the number of seats is low), then the private component of welfare is relatively
at. Once it is at enough, and  is small enough, then the selection component dominates so that giving
all seats to one group or the other increases welfare. Figures 17 and 18 illustrate this intuition. In Figure
17 we only increase  from 0:3 to 0:5, in Figure 18 we only decrease S from 10 to 5. As can be seen, in
both cases the welfare function is concave and, as a result, the non-discrimination quota is optimal.
Figure 17: Social Welfare (with the selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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 = 0,  = 0:5, 1A = 
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Figure 18: Social Welfare (with the selection e¤ect, the symmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = 0,  = 0:3, 1A = 
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A = 0:4, and S = 5.
The Asymmetric Case When the groups are di¤erent in terms of their acquired ability distribution
and  < 1, then both forces are at play. The presence of the selection e¤ect shifts the optimal quota
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towards the disadvantaged group. However, the e¤ort e¤ect shifts the quota in favor of the advantaged
group. Figure 19 depicts the social welfare function for di¤erent values of . The upper curve is the
welfare function when  = 0:8. As can be seen, in this case the optimal quota is in favor of the advantaged
group (optimal  is lower than the non-discrimination quota given by 0:3932). That is, the e¤ort e¤ect
is stronger than the selection e¤ect. When  is equal to 0:5 (the middle curve), the two e¤ects are of
the same magnitude and, therefore, the optimal quota is close to the non-discrimination quota. Finally,
when  = 0:2, one can see that the optimal quota is in favor of the disadvantaged group as the selection
e¤ect prevails over the e¤ort e¤ect.
Figure 19: Social Welfare (with the selection e¤ect, the asymmetric case)
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The parametrization:  = f0:8; 0:5; 0:2g,  = 0:3, 1A = 0:5, 2A = 0:2, and S = 5.
5 Extensions
In our model, we make several assumptions and it is important to understand the extent to which our
results depend on them. First, we assume no uncertainty in terms of the performance in the exam. As a
result, agents expend just enough e¤ort to get in, so that more able agents exert less e¤ort, and all agents
above an ability threshold get in. Those agents with abilities below this threshold do not get in, nor do
they exert any e¤ort. The e¤ort e¤ect follows basically from this: reallocating seats to the advantaged
group reduces total e¤ort as this group has higher average total ability and, therefore, tends to expend
less (wasteful) e¤ort. This intuition goes through for small enough levels of randomness in performance.
In general, with randomness the e¤ort function becomes hump shaped over ability. The least able
put in little or no e¤ort and rely on luck to get in, while the most able need to put in little e¤ort to get
in. Those in between need to work to get in. As a result, the disadvantaged could put in more or less
e¤ort than the advantaged on average so that the results depend on the position of the hump and the
distribution of abilities. If the less advantaged put in more e¤ort, then discriminating against them helps
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and vice versa.
The selection e¤ect is more general. The exam selects on the basis of total ability which is on average
higher in the advantaged group. Society values native ability more than the exam does. Conditional
on getting in, the native ability of those from the disadvantaged group is higher and this is true with
or without uncertainty. Consequently, in general, the selection e¤ect makes it welfare increasing to
discriminate in favor of the less advantaged.
Second, we assume that there is only one school. It is relatively straightforward to show that the
intuition remains valid with more schools. When one discriminates in favor of the less advantaged, their
cuto¤s fall in each school. As a result, they put in less e¤ort. The opposite occurs in the more advantaged
group. As the more advantaged on average put in less e¤ort, welfare falls due to the e¤ort e¤ect. The
selection e¤ect of course generalizes (these results are available in the Appendix).
6 Conclusion
Most of the work on preferences and a¢ rmative action has focused on statistical discrimination. Given
preferences, blacks may work less hard and so on average be worse than whites precisely because of
preferences. Employers then prefer to hire whites as race is observable. However, if the basis on which
preferences are given is not observable, then this model is less valid. In India for example, it is not always
easy to tell caste, especially in the cities, as caste based last names are not always used. If preferences
are based on background, or parental income, as has been proposed, then again those given preferences
may not be easily identiable.26 In such settings we show that while there is no one size ts all policy,
we can provide some guidance on when a¢ rmative action might be welfare improving.
We identify two distortions: an e¤ort distortion that arises from wasteful e¤ort, and a selection
distortion that arises from society placing a greater weight on native ability than does the placement
system. How these two play o¤ against each other and interact results in a one size does not t all
answer. Preferences may be good for one society and bad for another. The disadvantaged group puts
in more e¤ort to get in on average than the advantaged one. Given the number of seats, preferences
in favor of the disadvantaged group raise the average e¤ort level and this reduces welfare. This e¤ect
is large when tuition is low and potential surplus is dissipated via e¤ort. However, if society puts more
weight on natural ability than does the placement algorithm, then there is an additional selection e¤ect
that operates. The disadvantaged group, that gets in, on average has greater natural ability. This makes
preferences in their favor desirable. The former e¤ect dominates when tuition is low and the latter when
it is high. As a result, our work suggests that while preferences may be a good idea in the US where
tuition tends to be high, it may be a very bad idea in India where tuition is very low.
26After all, after going through a university education a native accent is often shed in favor of a one that blends in more
easily.
36
References
Acemoglu, Daron and J. Angrist (2000) How Large are Human Capital Externalities? Evidence From
Compulsory Schooling Laws,NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 15, pp. 9-59.
Alon, Sigal and Marta Tienda (2007), Diversity, Opportunity and the Shifting Meritocracy in Higher
Education,American Sociological Review 72, No. 4.
Amrein, Audrey L. and David C. Berliner. (2002) High-Stakes Testing, Uncertainty, and Student Learn-
ing. Education Policy Analysis Archives, Volume 10, Number 18, pp. 1-74.
Arrow, Kenneth J., (1973). The Theory of Discrimination. In: Ashenfelter, O., Rees, A. (Eds.), Dis-
crimination in Labor Markets. Princeton University Press, pp. 333.
Arcidiacano, Peter; Aucejo, Esteban and Ken Spenner. (2012) What Happens After Enrollment? An
Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Di¤erences in GPA and Major Choice. IZA Journal of Labor
Economics, Vol. 1, Article 5.
Chade, Hector; Lewis, Gregory and Lones Smith. (2011) Student Portfolios and the College Admissions
Problem. Mimeo.
Cestau, Dario; Epple, Dennis; and Holger Sieg. (2012) Admitting Students to Selective Education
Programs: Merit, Proling and A¢ rmative Action. Mimeo.
Chan, Jimmy and Erik Eyster (2003) Does Banning A¢ rmative Action Lower College Student Quality?
The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 858-872.
Coate, Stephen and Glenn C. Loury. (1993) "Will A¢ rmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereo-
types?" American Economics Review, 83(5), pp. 1220-1240.
Fang, Hanming and Andrea Moro (2011) Theories of Statistical Discrimination and A¢ rmative Action:
A Survey. Chapter 5 in Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A. North Holland.
Ferman, Bruno and Juliano Assuncao (2005) A¢ rmative Action in University Admission and High
School StudentsProciency. Mimeo. Department of Economics, PUC-Rio.
Fernández, Raquel and Jordi Galí (199) To Each According to...? Markets, Tournaments, and the
Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints.The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp.
799-824.
Fain, James R. (2009) A¢ rmative Action Can Increase E¤ort. Journal of Labor Research. Vol 30, pp.
168175.
37
Frisancho Robles, Veronica and Kala Krishna (2012) A¢ rmative Action in Higher Education in India:
Targeting, Catch Up, and Mismatch,NBER Working Paper No. 17727.
Fryer, Roland and Glenn Loury (2005). A¢ rmative Action in Winner Take All Markets.Journal of
Economic Inequality, Vol 3, pp. 263-280. Springer.
Fryer R, Loury G, Yuret T. (2008). An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind A¢ rmative Action.Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization. Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 319-355.
Fryer, Roland and Glenn Loury (2013) Valuing Diversity. Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy.
Fu, Qiang (2006)  A Theory of A¢ rmative Action in College Admissions. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 44,
No. 3, July, pp.420428.
Hickman, Brent (2011) "E¤ort, Race Gaps, and A¢ rmative Action: a Game-Theoretic Analysis of College
Admission," Mimeo.
Kenderov, Petar S. (2006) Competitions and Mathematics Education,Proceedings of the International
Congress of Mathematicians, pp. 1583-1598.-355.
Loury, Linda Datcher, and David Garman. (1993). A¢ rmative Action in Higher Education.American
Economic Review. Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 99103.
Lochner, Lance and Alexander Monge-Naranjo. (2012) Credit Constraints in Education.Annual Review
of Economics. 2012. 4:22556.
Moro, Andrea, (2003). The E¤ect of Statistical Discrimination on Black-White Wage Inequality: Esti-
mating a Model with Multiple Equilibria. International Economic Review. 44 (2), 457500.
Moro, Andrea and Peter Norman. (2003). A¢ rmative Action in a Competitive Economy. Journal of
Public Economics. 87 (34), 567594.
Phelps, E., (1972). The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. American Economic Review. 62, 659
661.
Rothstein, Jesse M. and Albert Yoon (2008) A¢ rmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do
Racial Preferences Do?University of Chicago Law Review 75(2), pp. 649-714.
Seigel, Ron (2009) All Pay Actions, Econometrica, 77(1), pp7192.
Seigel, Ron (2013) Asymmetric Contests with Head Starts and Non-Monotonic Costs.American Eco-
nomic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.
Shaked, M. and Shanthikumar, G. J. (2007) Stochastic Orders,Springer Series in Statistics.
38
